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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Wed Jan 10, 2018 9:22 pm 
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To drag this back onto TANKS:

In the 1 April 1945 US/UK War Production schedule, the Centurion Tank had the following schedule:

2 x May 1945
8 x June 1945
40 in July/August/Sep 1945
110 in Fourth Quarter 1945

By the 1 July 1945 US/UK War Production schedule, Centurion was "Schedule Not Available"; meaning it may have been in "limbo", because the Commonwealth Corps that was going to invade Japan in 1946 was going to be organized and equipped with US equipment; not British; so building Centurion would not have had any real effect in Japan; so that was up in the air.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Thu Jan 11, 2018 1:49 am 
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KDahm wrote:

"The F4U could carry 4000 lbs of bombs, and a torpedo could be strapped under a Hellcat."

You meant to write Helldiver, didn't you? That plane was a high performance DB/TB and fully debugged since 1944.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Thu Jan 11, 2018 2:43 am 
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Also, by the summer of 1945, the BT2D is already a going concern, and if there was a pressing need for a Better TBF, you could accellerate that instead of the "damaged goods" that (unfairly or not) is the TBY program.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Thu Jan 11, 2018 8:56 am 
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MKSheppard wrote:
People have been sidetracked for the last 30 years on the bureaucratic battles within the US Army over what does what and how. That merely slowed tank development by about 12~ months. What people have missed (the forest for the trees) is the significant role that the THEATER/FRONT COMMANDER had in World War II on equipment operational status. Theater Commanders saying "no" kill the chance of a weapons system of being deployed.

Or so they liked to think. Read Nick Moran's material on the Tank Destroyers and the second of the two Sherman talks. The Theater commanders were a significant voice certainly, an important voice indeed but they were not as decisive as you make out. They were one voice amongst many. A loud voice no doubt but not the only one.

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Case in point, the TBY Seawolf.

Indeed but not the way you think. By 1945, the TBY was obsolescent both in terms of performance and concept. The carriers were concentrating heavily on fighters and fighter-bombers for their air groups and the attack groups were already going to the single-seat format. Thus, the AD-1 and the AM-1 with the latter losing out to the former.

By the way, the TB3F became the AF-1 Guardian and was an ASW aircraft; it would have (and eventually did) replace the TBM in that role. The change from torpedo attack to ASW was officially made in December 1945

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Likewise, over in the AAF; George Kenney kept asking for B-29's and got told over and over "No. No. No." So he asked, "What else you got?" and ran away with the remnants of the B-32 Dominator program.

Which doesn't support your case at all.

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In the AGF side of things; the Army deployed two experimental types of Mortars to Hawaii in Summer 1945, a 105mm and 155mm. The using commands didn't like the 105 as it had in their view no real advantage over the existing 4.2" Chemical Mortar. But they did like the 155mm. Guess which mortar got sent to Okinawa, arriving in August 1945?

Actually the key issue was whether the mortars in question should be rifled or not. There was a lot of operational experience with mortars and the consensus was that rifled mortars were less effective for their particular operational niche than smoothbores. It's worth noting that the 155mm mortar was never general issue and remained the T25.

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If that was true, why did the BMG disappear so fast? It was the tank equivalent of the appendix from the early experiments in mechanization with multi turrets, etc because people were still uncertain over the reliability/ease of use of the early radios; so the bow gunner could man the radio/keep it running while as an ancillary task, spray random fire.


Because tanks were changing roles; the infantry close support role was going away and tanks were concentrating on the tank vs tank role. Deleting the bow gun meant that the frontal armor could be unpierced, significantly increasing its strength, the crew could be reduced from five men to four, the internal layout could be simplified etc etc. In short, there were many reasons why the bow gun went. Again, its not a question of one overriding reason but a complex of them and a decision based on the balance of capabilities. Note by the way that a significant number of post-war designs kept a bow gun (the T44 and T54/T55 both had bow guns although they're not obvious. The bow gun didn't vanish until the T55A. IIRC the M47 was the last US tank to have a bow gun. That bow gun is an interesting marker of the shift in emphasis from a tank being general support to anti-tank.

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He couldn't hit anything worth a damn with the BMG; only being able to aim wildly through tracer through a periscope with poor vision. By contrast, the coaxial is slaved to the main armament so the tank commander can direct the gunner who can have a much clearer FOV of the target area to target machine gun fire at.


Not according to tank crews. The problem with the coax is that it is slaved to the main gun. It points at the same place as the main gun and to shift the point of aim requires shifting the PoA of the main gun. Which is unfortunate if the targets are separated.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Thu Jan 11, 2018 9:59 am 
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Got a question about ammo storage. How many tanks needed ammo resupply before they needed refueling? It's stuck in my head that armored forces were limited by their fuel supply, not by how much ammo they had.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Thu Jan 11, 2018 10:21 am 
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jemhouston wrote:
Got a question about ammo storage. How many tanks needed ammo resupply before they needed refueling? It's stuck in my head that armored forces were limited by their fuel supply, not by how much ammo they had.

That's a really good question. Reading Russian memoirs, they mention refuelling but bombing up seems to have been an adjunct function of that process. I can't find any mention in those memoirs of tanks running low on ammunition. Its worth noting that the Russians were perfectly happy with much lower ammunition stowage than 70 rounds. The SU-100 carried 33 rounds, the IS-3 had 28. The T-34-76 had 70+ rounds but this dropped to 60 for the T-34-85.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Thu Jan 11, 2018 4:46 pm 
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Also noteworthy is that the US M10, M18 and M36 always had very limited ammo capacities. Now you could argue they only needed to carry AP, but in practice they shot a lot more HE then AP and when all is said and done often operated like nerfed tanks. There is a mention in either Hunnicutt or one of the Zaloga's books that a M18 commander complained that he had to use 76mm ammo to kill enemy infantry when he would have preferred a coaxial gun to conserve that ammo for more important targets.


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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Thu Jan 11, 2018 6:55 pm 
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Francis Urquhart wrote:
Its worth noting that the Russians were perfectly happy with much lower ammunition stowage than 70 rounds. The SU-100 carried 33 rounds, the IS-3 had 28. The T-34-76 had 70+ rounds but this dropped to 60 for the T-34-85.

I can absolutely see Russian tankists observing that if one hits one's target, not having as many shells is less of a problem. :twisted:

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Thu Jan 11, 2018 7:07 pm 
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The Bushranger wrote:
Also, by the summer of 1945, the BT2D is already a going concern, and if there was a pressing need for a Better TBF, you could accellerate that instead of the "damaged goods" that (unfairly or not) is the TBY program.


So be it...young Jedi...

BT2D Dauntless II production doesn't start at Douglas El Segundo until March 1946, slowly building up to 100+ planes by November 1946.

BTM Mauler production doesn't start at Martin Baltimore until January 1946 and slowly builds up to 100+ by September 1946.

Francis Urquhart wrote:
Indeed but not the way you think. By 1945, the TBY was obsolescent both in terms of performance and concept.


Actually, in 1945 the TBM was obsolescent.

They managed to paper over some of the issues with the TBM-3E version, which deleted the ventral gun to save weight; and they had the TBM-4 with strengthened wings coming along to allow higher gee pullouts; to improve glide bombing/dive bombing capability.

But the big thing was the Avenger had too much stuff in it by 1945 that it's top speed was dragging down.

TBY with it's 30+ MPH speed boost and engine semi-commonality with the F4U and F6F (all three have R-2800s of different marks) would have been the "interim" torpedo attack aircraft for 1945-1946, supplementing the Avenger until the TB3F came on line in 1947.

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The carriers were concentrating heavily on fighters and fighter-bombers for their air groups and the attack groups were already going to the single-seat format. Thus, the AD-1 and the AM-1 with the latter losing out to the former.


Actually, the BT2D and BTM were complimentary replacements.

BT2D was the lightweight replacement for CVE/CV.

BTM was the heavyweight replacement for CVB.

Likewise, the Ryan FR Fireball was the Lightweight to the Heavyweight Curtiss F15C. So why did the Fireball go into production and the F15C die? Because Curtiss just simply could not close the circle regarding weight on the F15C.

It is very little known today, but the US WWII Carrier Fleet was frankensteined between ships of varying deck weight strengths -- forget about Long Hull / Short Hull Essexes and AA configuration. With SHANGRI-LA, they introduced "Block II" Essexes built with heavier flight decks and heavier arresting gear and catapults to handle heavier aircraft. It's why SHANGRI-LA did the PBJ Mitchell carrier tests.

If they had gone ahead with F15C production, they would've destroyed the concept of a standardized carrier air group that could go on any ship of the class that the air group was configured for.

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By the way, the TB3F became the AF-1 Guardian and was an ASW aircraft; it would have (and eventually did) replace the TBM in that role. The change from torpedo attack to ASW was officially made in December 1945.


You're making the same mistake that Nick Moran did with his article on "how suitable was [the] T29?"

Link to P1
Link to P2

Where he quotes a 1948 document on the suitability of the T29/T30 as a heavy tank; which was three years after the end of WWII and they had been reduced to an engineering test program to try out various components for future US tanks (transmission/engines/fire control).

Original sources from 1945 reveal what the T29/T30 really were; by what they were intended to equip:

T29: 12 to 16 x Self-Propelled Tank Destroyer Battalions
T30: 7 x Self-Propelled Assault Artillery Battalions -- idea was to give one BN to each Armored Division.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Thu Jan 11, 2018 8:03 pm 
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FU screwed up and edited my post out of oblivion. I recovered it through my phone's offline cache.

Francis Urquhart wrote:
The Theater commanders were a significant voice certainly, an important voice indeed but they were not as decisive as you make out. They were one voice amongst many. A loud voice no doubt but not the only one.

They didn't have the powers that theater commanders do today, due to the WWII era structure of the War Department/Army; but they were still able to exert major influences on the procurement of ordnance/aviation materiel for their commands. NATO (and later ETO) were the command with the biggest influence on tanks as the prime consumers of tank/ordnance materiel in the Army.

BTW, thanks for being so persistent on this. It made me realize exactly why Arnold appointed himself as Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force.

a.) As Commanding General, 20AF, he could request things from AAF HQ which he would then reply to as Commanding General, AAF; in effect cutting out whole layers in the equipment request/supply cycle.

b.) As COMGEN, 20AF he had direct chain of command control over the 20AF.

With other numbered Air Forces, he had to contend with theater commanders, reducing him to indirect command -- if for example, he had tried to reassign George Kenney away from Fifth Air Force, he would have to contend with MacArthur in MacArthur's role as GHQ SWPA; and Mac could either go to the top (Roosevelt) or near the top (Marshall). Same thing in the ETO with 8AF, only with the added bonus of having to deal with the British.

This direct control by Arnold made sacking Heywood Hansell in January 1945 and replacing him with Saint Curtis significantly easier from both internal and external political standpoints (what I mean by internal is that even Arnold had to contend with the social dynamics and mores built up within the Army and the AAF itself).

Which doesn't [George Kenney and the B-32] support your case at all.

Actually, it does. It shows that theater commanders can request (and can get) specific types of equipment.

George Kenney is also star in another prime case -- the A-26.

When FEAF evaluated the A-26, they basically did not like it because of:

1.) Lack of visibility for pilot; particularly with the engines blocking side/rear visibility, importnat for the low altitude skip/glide bombing employed by FEAF.

2.) Lack of forward firepower -- A-26s at the time had six gun noses; and if you wanted more forward firepower, you had to add underwing gun pods that drug down top speed significantly.

It took them redesigning the A-26 to the eight-gun nose, and adding options for 3 to 4 .50 cal wing guns in addition to the redesigned canopy for there to be a retest by the pilot who flew the original SWPA evaluation missions on the A-26; to change Kenney's mind on the A-26 as a replacement for the A-20/B-25; and Kenney specifically called for the creation of "General Kenney Special" A-26s, the last A-26B's ever built (see attachment).

Attachment:
A-26B_Kenney.jpg
A-26B_Kenney.jpg [ 64.09 KiB | Viewed 246 times ]


Actually the key issue was whether the mortars in question should be rifled or not. There was a lot of operational experience with mortars and the consensus was that rifled mortars were less effective for their particular operational niche than smoothbores.

The 105/155 Mortars (plus a lot of others) were the results of the "Special Projects" division of the War Department General Staff (WDGS) called the New Developments Division (NDD). You don't find them much at all in the histories of the war. They are as far as everyone knows, non entitities, despite them coordinating the "Z" (Zebra) mission to ETO.

Those two mortars arose out of an overall program for Jungle Warfare Equipment that was managed and coordinated by NDD; to develop weapons optimized specifically to fight the Japanese.

It's worth noting that the 155mm mortar was never general issue and remained the T25.

77 of them were shipped to Okinawa for combat use with 10th Army in Summer 1945. That's more than just a few test pieces.

Not according to tank crews. The problem with the coax is that it is slaved to the main gun. It points at the same place as the main gun and to shift the point of aim requires shifting the PoA of the main gun. Which is unfortunate if the targets are separated.

Solution: Overwatch by mutually supporting tanks or accompanying infantry. If you really need to stop someone running in front of you with a panzerfaust, instead of using a bow machine gun, detonate a grenade on the outside of the hull.

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Last edited by MKSheppard on Fri Jan 12, 2018 7:03 pm, edited 1 time in total.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Thu Jan 11, 2018 9:46 pm 
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MKSheppard wrote:
The Bushranger wrote:
Also, by the summer of 1945, the BT2D is already a going concern, and if there was a pressing need for a Better TBF, you could accellerate that instead of the "damaged goods" that (unfairly or not) is the TBY program.


So be it...young Jedi...

BT2D Dauntless II production doesn't start at Douglas El Segundo until March 1946, slowly building up to 100+ planes by November 1946.

BTM Mauler production doesn't start at Martin Baltimore until January 1946 and slowly builds up to 100+ by September 1946.


Hence my note that "if there was a pressing need for a Better TBF, you could accellerate that". There wasn't. So they didn't.

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Actually, in 1945 the TBM was obsolescent.

They managed to paper over some of the issues with the TBM-3E version, which deleted the ventral gun to save weight; and they had the TBM-4 with strengthened wings coming along to allow higher gee pullouts; to improve glide bombing/dive bombing capability.

But the big thing was the Avenger had too much stuff in it by 1945 that it's top speed was dragging down.

TBY with it's 30+ MPH speed boost and engine semi-commonality with the F4U and F6F (all three have R-2800s of different marks) would have been the "interim" torpedo attack aircraft for 1945-1946, supplementing the Avenger until the TB3F came on line in 1947.


The problem with this reasoning is that the TBY Sea Wolf was not a successor, even by a half-generation, to the TBF/TBM Avenger. It was the Avenger's competitor, designed in 1939 and first flown two weeks after Pearl Harbor. A combination of being star-crossed and Vought being asked for twice the Corsairs they could build delivered yesterday, followed by the issues with Allentown (Brewster again!) and continued star-crossing issues, are why it "looks like" a 1944-1945 quasi-replacement.

Once you load on all the same equipment that was dragging down the Avenger - which they would have - how much faster would the Sea Wolf had been?

And engine commonality is a bug, not a feature, if Pratt & Whitney is already running at 110% trying to supply R-2800s for the F4U, F6F, B-26, A-26, P-47, and P-61 already. Remember that the main reason the A-38 died in @ was because the B-29 was slurping up the entire production supply of R-3350s; how much capacity did Pratt have for yet another aircraft using Double Wasps?

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Fri Jan 12, 2018 8:49 am 
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You have much to learn, grasshopper.

MKSheppard wrote:
Actually, in 1945 the TBM was obsolescent.

Of course it was; both it and the TBY were 1940/41 designs and showed it. The Bushranger does a first class job of dismantling this issue. It does not support your claim that the Theater chiefs dominated the decision making process.

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TBY with it's 30+ MPH speed boost and engine semi-commonality with the F4U and F6F (all three have R-2800s of different marks) would have been the "interim" torpedo attack aircraft for 1945-1946, supplementing the Avenger until the TB3F came on line in 1947.

No, it wouldn't because the TB3F was not coming on line as any kind of torpedo attack aircraft. It had already been reassigned to ASW work.

Quote:
You're making the same mistake that Nick Moran did with his article on "how suitable was [the] T29?"


No. And if you think Nick Moran is in error, write and tell him. He's a reasonable guy.

MKSheppard wrote:
They didn't have the powers that theater commanders do today, due to the WWII era structure of the War Department/Army; but they were still able to exert major influences on the procurement of ordnance/aviation materiel for their commands. NATO (and later ETO) were the command with the biggest influence on tanks as the prime consumers of tank/ordnance materiel in the Army.

Nobody is arguing that the theater commanders had a major influence on procurement. The issue is your initial claim that they had a veto power. They did not. if you are retreating from 'veto power" to "one major influence upon many others" then we are in agreement.

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Actually, it does. It shows that theater commanders can request (and can get) specific types of equipment.

Actually it doesn't. Of course theater commanders can get specific types of equipment assigned when they regard them as essential to their operational requirements. That is not what you were saying. The A-26 is also irrelevant to this point. Kenney's objections were based on sound operational arguments and supported by technical staff

In order to support your point you will have to find an issue where a theater commander was wrong, was opposed to everybody else in the decision-making process but forced his demands through anyway.

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77 of them were shipped to Okinawa for combat use with 10th Army in Summer 1945. That's more than just a few test pieces.

That is a small run of test pieces intended for operational evaluation.

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Solution: Overwatch by mutually supporting tanks or accompanying infantry. If you really need to stop someone running in front of you with a panzerfaust, instead of using a bow machine gun, detonate a grenade on the outside of the hull.


That's a wargaming argument that assumes total visibility and control. It misses the point completely which is that in an infantry support role things happen unexpectedly. The decline of, and eventual disappearance of, the bow machine gun was the result of the eclipse of the infantry support role in favor of the tank-killing role. In effect, tanks vanished and were replaced by tank destroyers. Be that as it may, if we look at situations where the infantry support role, reappeared, so did machine guns. There was a major effort in the Korean War to equip tanks and tank destroyers with additional machine guns (including replacing the bow gun where it had been removed) and this was repeated in Vietnam and the assorted sandpits. These days we use a stabilized, remote control weapons station but is a direct descendent of the bow machine gun.

The problem here is that you are assuming a simple, one-dimensional viewpoint on decision making and it just does not happen that way. The decisions that happen are a result of a complex maze of influences, prejudices, technical, operational and strategic evaluations etc. Trying to pick out a single thread or claim that a single sector was 'the reason' is oversimplification.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Fri Jan 12, 2018 9:06 am 
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M.Becker wrote:
KDahm wrote: "The F4U could carry 4000 lbs of bombs, and a torpedo could be strapped under a Hellcat." You meant to write Helldiver, didn't you? That plane was a high performance DB/TB and fully debugged since 1944.


No, he means Hellcat. Both the F4U and the F6F were considered as torpedo delivery platforms. As was the SB2C by the way. There was a trend in the latter years of WW2 to design "torpedo fighters". The British produced the Firebrand, the Germans a version of the FW-190 and, as we said, the US considered the use of the F4U and F6F in the role. The British actually built the Firebrand and it remained in service for a few years after the war before being replaced by the Wyvern.

In some ways I suppose it was a natural evolution; a torpedo weighed around 1800 to 2200 pounds which was within the load-lifting capability of fighter-bombers in the late-war era. So why not use that capability to lift a torpedo? That means the multi-crewed torpedo bombers could be dropped from the inventory.

What really killed the idea, more than any other single factor was that in 1945, the US Navy had no real rivals left. The German fleet had gone, the Japanese fleet had gone, the Russian fleet was a joke and the British fleet was a junior ally. There was, quite simply, nobody left to drop torpedoes on. The torpedo-fighter and torpedo-dive-bomber had shown that other aircraft could do the job if the need arose. However, the overwhelming use of carrier aviation post-WW2 was ground support for forces ashore and that required bomb-dropping, not torpedo launching. Hence the appearance of the AD-1 and AM-1 (with the latter vanishing pretty sharpish as its nastier flying characteristics became apparent). So, the AD-1s equipped the medium attack groups, AU-1s the light attack groups and the AJ the heavy groups. All bombers, not a torpedo plane in sight. By early 1945 it was apparent that torpedo planes were done. It's stayed that way. However, the ASW role was seen as being very important as the TB3F became the ASW bird to replace the TBM and it was, in time, replaced by the S-2 and S-3.

It's worth noting by the way, that in 1945 onwards, the use of the Avenger as a torpedo bomber was declining steeply. Mostly it was used as a glide bomber and rocket launching platform but I suspect that was more to do with trying to use an aircraft that was occupying deck space than anything else. AFAIK the attack on Yamato was probably the last time a carrier-based torpedo attack was carried out. That alone knocks out any chance of additional specialized torpedo bombers being produced.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Fri Jan 12, 2018 12:23 pm 
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By the time aircraft came back into the anti-shipping role in a serious way with the Soviet threat there were the beginnings of missiles to us, and missiles aren't nearly as finnicky about the drop speed and height when being launched as torpedoes are!


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PostPosted: Fri Jan 12, 2018 12:52 pm 
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David Newton wrote:
By the time aircraft came back into the anti-shipping role in a serious way with the Soviet threat there were the beginnings of missiles to us, and missiles aren't nearly as finnicky about the drop speed and height when being launched as torpedoes are!

Very much so; by 1945, dropping torpedoes from aircraft against well-armed warships was a fools game. The loss rates were high, the hit rates were low and the penalties for carrying aircraft dedicated to the role were too high. Already glide bombs and cruse missiles were around and they offered a much better way of getting at ships at much less risk. In fact, a good argument can be made that if Japanese warships had had the kind of intermediate-range AA firepower than American ships had, we'd have seen torpedo-bombing dying off a lot earlier.

Even without anti-ship missiles, torpedo attack as going away by 1945. Skip-bombing was as effective as torpedo drops and offered the potential to do a lot more damage. Rocket fire was also a viable alternative and could butcher the upperworks of a ship. Cluster-bombs were coming as well and they did a lot to solve the accuracy issues. Looked at objectively, its not surprising that the 1944/45 generation of torpedo planes were still-borne.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Fri Jan 12, 2018 12:57 pm 
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Francis Urquhart wrote:
AFAIK the attack on Yamato was probably the last time a carrier-based torpedo attack was carried out.

Not quite. I believe that ADs carried out a torpedo attack on a North Korean dam, presumably from a carrier. (Don't have the relevant book to hand right now.) But that's a really niche application, and doesn't undermine your main point at all.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Fri Jan 12, 2018 1:45 pm 
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Francis Urquhart wrote:
David Newton wrote:
By the time aircraft came back into the anti-shipping role in a serious way with the Soviet threat there were the beginnings of missiles to us, and missiles aren't nearly as finnicky about the drop speed and height when being launched as torpedoes are!

Very much so; by 1945, dropping torpedoes from aircraft against well-armed warships was a fools game. The loss rates were high, the hit rates were low and the penalties for carrying aircraft dedicated to the role were too high. Already glide bombs and cruse missiles were around and they offered a much better way of getting at ships at much less risk. In fact, a good argument can be made that if Japanese warships had had the kind of intermediate-range AA firepower than American ships had, we'd have seen torpedo-bombing dying off a lot earlier.

Even without anti-ship missiles, torpedo attack as going away by 1945. Skip-bombing was as effective as torpedo drops and offered the potential to do a lot more damage. Rocket fire was also a viable alternative and could butcher the upperworks of a ship. Cluster-bombs were coming as well and they did a lot to solve the accuracy issues. Looked at objectively, its not surprising that the 1944/45 generation of torpedo planes were still-borne.


Avengers would have made a good platform for the ASM-N-2 Bat I would think, had the Bat been around earlier. Mmm... ever thought about using it for the TBO series?? The time line plays out a little further to work out the Bat's bugs.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Fri Jan 12, 2018 1:53 pm 
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The Hwachon Dam raid was carried out 1 May 1951 by AD-4 Skyraiders flying from USS Princeton (CV-37). Only three of the eight Skyraider pilots involved had ever dropped a torpedo before, which illustrates the obsolescence of the tactic. See https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/sto ... achon-dam/

In 1982 the Argentines dusted off some old Mark 13 torpedoes and planned to attack the British task force with torpedo-armed Pucarás, but the war ended before they could get into action.

https://wwiiafterwwii.wordpress.com/201 ... lands-war/

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Fri Jan 12, 2018 3:42 pm 
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The torpedo-armed Pucara has always fascinated me. What a flashback....

Eric wrote:
Francis Urquhart wrote:
David Newton wrote:
By the time aircraft came back into the anti-shipping role in a serious way with the Soviet threat there were the beginnings of missiles to us, and missiles aren't nearly as finnicky about the drop speed and height when being launched as torpedoes are!

Very much so; by 1945, dropping torpedoes from aircraft against well-armed warships was a fools game. The loss rates were high, the hit rates were low and the penalties for carrying aircraft dedicated to the role were too high. Already glide bombs and cruse missiles were around and they offered a much better way of getting at ships at much less risk. In fact, a good argument can be made that if Japanese warships had had the kind of intermediate-range AA firepower than American ships had, we'd have seen torpedo-bombing dying off a lot earlier.

Even without anti-ship missiles, torpedo attack as going away by 1945. Skip-bombing was as effective as torpedo drops and offered the potential to do a lot more damage. Rocket fire was also a viable alternative and could butcher the upperworks of a ship. Cluster-bombs were coming as well and they did a lot to solve the accuracy issues. Looked at objectively, its not surprising that the 1944/45 generation of torpedo planes were still-borne.


Avengers would have made a good platform for the ASM-N-2 Bat I would think, had the Bat been around earlier. Mmm... ever thought about using it for the TBO series?? The time line plays out a little further to work out the Bat's bugs.


BAT and/or PELICAN, which used SARH instead of Bat's active homing. The interesting thing, though, is the Navy's efforts to produce a missile that carried a torpedo under Project KINGFISHER, that actually saw a weapon - PETREL - enter service for a time in the 1950s, carried by P2Vs and (at least on paper) S2Fs.

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Last edited by The Bushranger on Fri Jan 12, 2018 4:00 pm, edited 1 time in total.

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 Post subject: Re: M26 Pershing:
PostPosted: Fri Jan 12, 2018 3:58 pm 
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The Bushranger wrote:
The interesting thing, though, is the Navy's efforts to produce a missile that carried a torpedo under Project KINGFISHER, that actually saw a weapon - PETREL - enter service for a time in the 1950s, carried by P2Vs and (at least on paper) S2Fs.


The Russians had a similar thing called RAT-52. The P2V crews actually found out that the best way to use Petrel was to dive it, complete with torpedo, into the target ship. The chance of a hit was significantly higher and the damage it inflicted was just as critical. A bit later on the Russians had an anti-submarine missile UGMT-1 (we called SSN-14) that was also supposed to carry an ASW torpedo to the location of a hostile submarine. UGMT-1 had a secondary use against surface ships wherein it was supposed to drop the torpedo short of the target etc. Only, like the Petrel crews, the Russians found the most efficient way to use it was to dive the thing into the target. So, the Russians, being the Russians, put a second shaped charge warhead into the UGMT-1 missile.

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